KEY ISSUES

Expected shift of lines of military control from LNA/Benghazi to GNA/Tripoli.

The humanitarian situation is defined by Libyan authorities as dire and aggravated by COVID-19.

There was a reported serious lack of capacity in the south to handle the COVID-19 response.

South-specific list of recommendations was developed.

Health sector plan of action for Sirt and areas of displacement was prepared.

43 public PHC facilities and 26 public hospitals are supported with supplies and services.

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SITUATION OVERVIEW

The security situation in Libya continued to become increasingly tense. This is noted particularly in the frontlines of the oil crescent and around the city of Sirte, where there is a sustained activity of force mobilization, movements of military convoys and buildup of heavy equipment by both parties. Despite the escalating reinforcements, there had not been any significant report of armed confrontations.

Ongoing political instability, armed conflict and weakening of institutional structures. More than 400,000 IDPs and 654,000 migrants and refugees. Expected shift of lines of military control from LNA/Benghazi to GNA/Tripoli.

The predominant focus remains on addressing humanitarian needs while simultaneously strengthening the capacity of the national health system.

Since the resignation of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Libya Ghassan Salame after the Berlin Conference, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has until present been unable to appoint his successor. Member States clearly demonstrate the need for the increased and more active UN role.

The July announcement of Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) that it has lifted force majeure nationwide and resumed its vital work was very much welcomed by most of the Member States, also as a sign to support financial transparency in Libya and, through UN-led dialogue, a common understanding among Libyans on an equitable distribution of oil and gas revenues. The NOC has come up with a plan to start production and place revenues into the NACA account, which would be unreachable for both sides of the conflict, including various militia groups. At the same time, despite this, there were again foreign-backed efforts against Libya, incursions by mercenaries against NOC facilities.

Meeting with House of Representatives (HoR) Speaker Aguila Saleh in Moscow on 3 July, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov reiterated Russia’s ‘principled’ support for the 6 June Cairo Declaration. HoR Speaker Saleh stated that Prime Minister al-Sarraj could not be a partner in political dialogue, and that the legitimate party was the High Council of State (HCS).

During a phone call with the Secretary-General on 1 July, Prime-Minister al-Sarraj reiterated that Haftar could not be a partner in political negotiations, and that a political solution should be based on the ‘voice of the Libyan people’ through a constitutional framework and elections; new elites representing the East should be encouraged to take part in political talks.

Libya is at a critical phase in the orientation of its energy system. Daily electricity blackouts in the West currently average 12 hours and 14 in the South, increasingly triggering demonstrations.

Across Libya, unemployment and mobility restrictions, as well as migrants’ lack of access to livelihoods, have significantly increased food insecurity, reduced access to health services, and eroded the coping capacities of vulnerable segments of the population.

There have been fresh population displacements from Tarhouna and Sirte to the eastern municipalities. The COVID19 response capacity of these municipalities needs to be assessed and their emergency response capacity must be strengthened.

In a statement issued on 13 July, the Tobruk based House of Representatives (HoR), while denouncing the Turkish “invasion” and stressing “Egypt’s strategic depth for Libya” officially requested Cairo to intervene in response to any threats that both Egypt and Libya could be facing regarding their national security.

On 16 July, in a meeting with Libyan tribal representatives, Egyptian President Sisi reiterated that Sirte and Jufra are a “red line” and that Egypt is ready to for a military intervention in Libya at the request of the HoR in its capacity as the “only elected and legitimate authority” representing the “head of state” in Libya.